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APPENDIX
PROPOSED STANDARDS RELATING TO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND DIS-
ABILITY RETIREMENT
I JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
1.1 Inherent Powers of The Court. The power to discipline judges is inherent
in the state's highest court. The inherent power of the court includes the
power to:
(a) Recommend impeachment;
(b) Impose discipline upon a judge as an attorney;
(c) Suspend with salary;
(d) Censure;
(e) Reprimand;
(f) Impose administrative sanctions, including transfer or reassignment;
and
(g) Take other action, as appropriate, including summary action in an
emergency.
Commentary
Inherent power is sometimes described as "implied," "essential," "inciden-
tal," or "necessary," but it is most often described as "inherent." It is essential to
the existence, dignity and operation of the court as a separate but equal part of
government. The authority is implied because it is indispensable to the court if the
court is to perform the duties specifically assigned to it.
This inherent power includes the authority to discipline judges independent of
any express constitutional grant. The court has this power because it is responsible
for the operation of the judicial branch and because the power has not been granted
to either of the other two branches. The power to remove a judge from office is
specifically omitted from the list of inherent powers of the court; inherent power
does not include the power to remove. Since that power is essential to an effective
disciplinary system, a constitutional provision is needed to give the court the
authority to remove judges. See Standard 1.3.
These standards are designed for all American judicial systems. Because state
courts are greater in number than their federal counterparts, and because there is a
split of opinion on the Joint Committee concerning the matter of federal judicial
discipline, the standards are designed chiefly with a view to the state's needs.
(Appendix I is a Committee statement regarding federal judicial discipline and
disability retirement).
A note concerning style. For ease of drafting the Joint Committee has adhered
to generic use throughout the standards so that male and female persons are
intended.
Finally the Joint Committee invited individuals and committees, judicial con-
ferences and councils, citizen committees and bar associations, and members of the
bench and bar to read, analyze and discuss these standards. All comments, sugges-
tions and criticisms along with requests for additional copies should be addressed to
the Project Director, Howard S. Primer, American Bar Association, 1155 East 60th
Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637.
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It is essential to have a method for imposing judicial discipline for the
following reasons: to protect the public; to preserve the integrity of the judicial
process; to maintain public confidence in the judiciary; and to create a greater
awareness of proper judicial behavior on the part of the judges themselves. There-
fore, in those states where there is no constitutional provision for a commission on
judicial discipline and disability retirement to handle matters of judicial misconduct
and disability, the court should exercise its inherent power. In those states where a
commission has been established, the court may still exercise its inherent power
along with the commission; although the court can, and in many cases should, rely
on the commission because of its special expertise in processing these matters.
1.2 Persons Subject to Discipline. At any level of government, anyone exer-
cising judicial powers and performing judicial functions, including judges
assigned to administrative duties within the judicial branch, should be
subject to judicial discipline and disability retirement.
Commentary
A judge's conduct on or off the bench should be subject to judicial discipline
and disability retirement when it brings discredit to the judiciary. This is true
whether the judge is full-time, or part-time, or recalled to service after retirement;
whether the judge is a city magistrate, justice of the peace, commissioner, referee or
any other person at any level of government acting under the authority of the
judiciary and performing judicial functions. If a commission exists, it should have
jurisdiction over all judicial officers.
Administrative procedures other than judicial discipline should be used for the
discipline and removal of officials acting as members of boards and commissions
performing quasi-judicial functions.
1.3 Constitutional Authority for Removing a Judge. The Constitution should
authorize the court to remove a judge from office for discipline or disability.
Commentary
While the court has the inherent power to discipline judges (see Standard 1.1)
it lacks the inherent power to remove them from office. That power is essential to an
effective disciplinary system, and a constitutional provision is needed to give the
court the authority to remove judges for misconduct or disability.
1.4 Establishment of Commission. A commission on judicial discipline and
disability retirement should be established by the constitution in each juris-
diction.
Commentary
A permanent commission should be established in each jurisdiction. A con-
stitutional provision provides permanency and emphasizes the importance of the
commission's work.
In 1960, by constitutional amendment, California created a permanent com-
mission to receive and investigate complaints against judges, hold hearings, and
make recommendations to the supreme court regarding misconduct or disability of
judges. Since then, similar bodies have been established in 46 states, the District of
Columbia, Guam and Puerto Rico.
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1.5 Discipline. The commission should have authority to receive information,
investigate, conduct hearings, and make recommendations to the court
concerning allegations of judicial misconduct.
Commentary
This approach combines all the following functions in a single commission:
receiving complaints, investigating, determining probable cause, conducting formal
hearings, making findings of fact, and making recommendations to the court
regarding discipline and disability. The court then reviews the record and imposes
discipline as warranted.
This approach is substantially followed in a majority of the jurisdictions with
commissions: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Geor-
gia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyo-
ming and Puerto Rico.
This system avoids multiple investigations, makes possible more prompt
determinations, and gives final disposition to the court in every case. The constitu-
tionality of a system of this type has been upheld in Withrow v. Larkin, 95 S. Ct.
1456 (1975).
Some jurisdictions presently use a board to find probable cause and a second
independent body to hear and determine the charges and impose discipline. In-
cluded in this approach are those states using a "Court on the Judiciary" to impose
discipline independently of the court, but occasionally subject to review by the
highest court. States currently using a bifurcated approach are: Alabama, Delaware,
Illinois, Oklahoma, New York, and West Virginia. As this Standard indicates, the
use of multiple bodies to handle matters of judicial misconduct or disability is not
recommended.
1.6 Disability. The commission should have authority to receive information,
investigate, conduct hearings, and make recommendations to the court
concerning allegations of the mental or physical disability of judges.
Commentary
Inability of a judge to perform his duties because of mental or physical
disability affects the administration of justice just as much as does judicial miscon-
duct. Therefore, the commission should have jurisdiction over these matters as
well. Most presently existing commissions have the power to deal with allegations
relating both to judicial misconduct and disability. See Section 8 of these standards.
1.7 Voluntary Retirement for Disability. The commission should have author-
ity to investigate, conduct hearings, and make recommendations with refer-
ence to voluntary retirement for disability.
Commentary
In some jurisdictions a judge can apply for disability retirement under a
statutory provision. Eligibility for pension benefits under disability retirement is
determined by a factfinder. The commission established for discipline and disability
retirement is well suited for this fact finding task. The request for disability
retirement may be made by the judge, by the chief justice, or by the commission.
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The rule prescribing commission duties with regard to disability retirement should
be in accord with the applicable statutes of the jurisdiction.
1.8 Impeachment. Removal by impeachment should be retained.
Commentary
Impeachment is the least desirable method of judicial discipline. It is an all-or-
nothing approach and ordinarily is effective only for egregious and spectacular
instances of misconduct. The impeachment process is subject to political considera-
tions; experience has shown it is expensive, cumbersome, and ineffective. If the
judicial discipline commission and the court are functioning properly in judicial
disciplinary enforcement, there will be no need for impeachment proceedings.
Impeachment should be retained, however, as a check not only upon the judiciary,
but upon the judicial discipline and disability retirement process as well. No other
method of judicial removal is justified or recommended.
2 ORGANIZATION, COMPOSITION AND STAFFING OF COMMISSION
2.1 Need for Independence. The commission should be independent of and
free from interference from the executive or legislative branches and al-
though operating within the judicial branch should report only to the supreme
court.
Commentary
Separation of powers requires that the disciplinary proceeding operate wholly
within the judicial branch of government. It should, however, be free from interfer-
ence by the judiciary if it is to function effectively and maintain public confidence.
2.2 Funding. The commission should be adequately funded to assure its inde-
pendence and effectiveness. Its necessary expenses should be provided for in
a separate and distinct budget.
Commentary
Adequate funding is essential to effective functioning of the commis-
sion. It should not have to rely upon donated services from other branches
of government.
Although the support of the commission will, in most jurisdictions, be
provided for in the judiciary budget, the commission should not be under its
control. This protects the integrity of the judiciary, so no one can charge
that the judiciary is withholding funds and thereby hampering the commis-
sion in investigating the conduct of one of its members.
2.3 Composition. The commission should be made up of judges other
than those on the state's highest court, lawyers, and public members.
Its members should serve for fixed terms that are staggered within
each classification and there should be a limitation on the length of
service by any one individual.
Commentary
The method of selecting the membership of the commission is left up to
each jurisdiction. It should be emphasized, however, that political and
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ideological considerations should not enter into the naming of commission
members. The commission's independence must be protected from the
appearance of impropriety and outside interference.
Since members of the court will be called upon to review the findings of
the commission and to impose final dispositions, they should not serve on
the commission. The judicial members on the commission may be appointed
by the court; the lawyer members may be appointed by the governing body
of the organized bar association, and, the public members may be appointed
by the governor.
Each of the classifications should be equally represented on the com-
mission. In addition, each classification member should serve for a fixed
term that is staggered within that classification. In that way there will always
be continuity, and by limiting the length of service by one member there will
constantly be fresh perspectives as well. For example, a nine-member
commission would be composed of three judges, three lawyers, and three
public members. Each member would serve for six years with one in each
classification being replaced every second year.
A commission member should be secure in knowing that he can only be
removed by a showing of good cause and then only by the chairman of the
commission.
2.4 Chairman. The chairman should be selected by the members of the
commission.
Commentary
The independence of the commission will be enhanced if the commis-
sion chooses its own leadership. The selection should occur with a change in
commission membership.
2.5 Alternate Members. Alternate members, to take the place of those
disqualified or absent, should be selected at the time and in the
manner prescribed for initial appointments in each representative
class, and should serve at the call of the chairman.
Commentary
An alternate should be used any time a member is either disqualified or
unable to attend a commission meeting. Alternates should be called from the
same representative group as the absent or disqualified member. If a vacan-
cy occurs that should be filled by an alternate during the pendency of a
hearing, it should be treated as would the replacement of a juror in a regular
civil trial. The alternates may sit with the commission to gain familiarity with
procedures and practices.
2.6 Rules of Procedure and Forms. The commission should have au-
thority to submit rules of procedure for the approval of the court, and
to develop appropriate forms for its proceedings.
Commentary
The commission is unique in its operation and will develop the expertise
necessary to propose its own rules. Since administrative procedures and
civil rules may not uniformally apply to these proceedings it is essential that
the commission have this authority. Since rule-making authority is only with
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the court, the commission should submit its proposed rules to it for approv-
al. In the absence of an applicable commission rule, the rules of civil
procedure should apply.
The commission should prepare forms to facilitate transaction of its
business, including, subpoenas, notices, complaints, waivers of confiden-
tiality, and requests for voluntary retirement. These may be submitted to the
court for its approval.
2.7 Executive Officer. The commission should appoint an executive of-
ficer and establish a permanent office.
Commentary
The'e should be a permanent office to which all inquiries are sent and to
which the public may be referred when inquiries or complaints are made to
other members of the judicial branch, the organized bar, or any other
agency. The existence, address and telephone number of the commission
should be made known to the public. All complaints should be acknow-
ledged by the commission as quickly as possible.
The permanent office can process and receive all inquiries, consolidate
multiple complaints, keep uniform records, and provide informed disposi-
tion of frivolous or unfounded complaints.
There should always be an executive officer directing the activities of
the permanent office. In jurisdictions where the workload is insufficient to
warrant hiring a person full-time for this position, someone not engaged in
active practice of law should be retained or designated to hold this position
on a part-time basis. The administrative director of the courts, the clerk of
the court or a member of the court's central staff, a law teacher or a retired
judge or lawyer may be appointed. If it is necessary to use other personnel
within the court system to perform these duties, it should be stressed that
the designated person is acting as an independent officer of the commission
and his independence from other court functions should be carefully pro-
tected.
2.8 Duties and Responsibilities of Executive Officer. The executive of-
ficer should have duties and responsibilities as prescribed by the
commission, including the authority to:
(a) Receive information, allegations, and complaints;




(f) Maintain the commission's records;
(g) Maintain statistics concerning the operation of the commission
and make them available to the commission, and to the court;
(h) Prepare the commission's budget for approval by the commis-
sion, and administer its funds;
(i) Employ and supervise other members of the commission's staff;
(j) Prepare an annual report of the commission's activities for pre-
sentation to the commission, to the court, and to the public.
(k) Employ, with the approval of the commission, special counsel,
private investigators, or other experts as necessary to investigate
and process matters before the commission and before the court.
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The use of the attorney general's staff prosecutor's or law en-
forcement officers for this purpose should be avoided.
Commentary
The executive officer, or in a busy office someone under the executive
officer's direction, should receive all complaints, information, and allega-
tions, whether written or oral. That person should immediately consider and
evaluate these complaints to determine whether on its face a cause within
the jurisdiction of the commission has been stated. (Standard 4.4). For
instance, when a complaint is only an attempted substitute for an appeal, the
complainant should be informed that the matter raised is outside the com-
mission's jurisdiction. Commission members should not respond to com-
plaints or inquiries received by them.
Once the complaint has been evaluated and jurisdiction is found to
exist, the complaint should be reviewed by the executive officer in an effort
to determine if it is based upon frivolous grounds. This screening should be
conducted in accordance with commission guidelines. If necessary to prop-
erly undertake the screening, the executive officer should be empowered to
conduct investigations. After concluding that the complaint states frivolous
grounds, it should be dismissed and, in accordance with Standard 4.14, a
report should be prepared for submission to the commission at its next
regular meeting. The executive officer should notify the complainant, if any,
that the complaint has been dismissed after the commission has reviewed
the executive officer's report. See Standard 4.12.
If the complaint is not dismissed by the executive officer and the
commission following preliminary screening, the executive officer should
conduct further necessary investigations; this may include interviewing the
judge whose conduct is in question as well as other witnessess. Standard 4
prescribes the procedure to be followed.
The hiring and supervising of all office staff authorized by the commis-
sion should be the responsibility of the executive officer.
The executive officer, with the approval of the commission, should also
have the authority to employ counsel, private investigators, or other experts
as necessary to investigate and process matters before the commission and
when necessary before the court. The use of law enforcement officials,
district attorneys, or members of the attorney general's staff is not recom-
mended. Since matters of judicial misconduct and disability is not their
regular responsibility, they may lack the expertise or fail to devote the
attention required due to the existence of other priorities among their pri-
mary responsibilities. Their use may also interefere with the independence
of the judiciary. As Standard 2.1 states, the commission should be complete-
ly independent and separate from the other branches of government.
The executive officer should maintain all the commission files in a
secure place. These files should contain copies of complaints, acknow-
ledgements of receipt of complaints, news clippings and other material that
may form the basis for initiating an inquiry, memoranda to the commission
with staff recommendations to dismiss complaints, records of contacts with
potential witnesses, summaries of witnesses' testimony if they are to be
called, all formal complaints, transcripts, budget records, meeting agendas,
and other material that would be useful for preparing the annual report.
Annual reports are published by many commissions. They are helpful in
acquainting judges with the practices of the commission. They acquaint
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lawyers and the public with the fact that procedures exist for judicial
discipline and disability. Public reporting also fulfills the function of impel-
ling commission members to evaluate their procedures and practices.
Insofar as practicable, statistics should be compiled in a manner that
would facilitate their use by other jurisdictions and by the National Clearing-
house designated in Standard 9.4. These statistics may be released to the
public at the discretion of the commission. It will be the executive officer's
responsibility to maintain all information necessary to compile the statistics.
The executive officer should maintain all budgetary information for the
commission, prepare a proposed budget for commission approval, approve
all expense forms of commission members, authorize the purchase of neces-
sary equipment, books and materials, and represent the commission at
budget hearings.
2.9 Absolute Immunity. Members of the commission, masters or refer-
ees, commission counsel, and staff should be absolutely immune
from suit for all conduct in the course of their official duties.
Commentary
Commission members and staff must be free from harassment. Immuni-
ty assures the independence of the commission and eliminates a major
deterrent to service.
3 JURISDICTION AND GROUNDS FOR DISCIPLINE
3.1 Jurisdiction Over Sitting Judge. Other than jurisdiction through im-
peachment, the commission should have exclusive jurisdiction over
the conduct of all sitting judges, including part-time judges. This
jurisdiction should include conduct that occurred prior to a judge
assuming judicial office.
Commentary
It is to the benefit of the public and necessary for the independence of
the judicial office that questions regarding the conduct of a sitting judge
should be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the commission. This is true
whether the conduct occurred prior to or while holding the judicial office.
Jurisdictional uncertainties between the commission and a lawyer disci-
plinary board about the conduct of judges who are also lawyers impede the
judicial and the lawyer disciplinary processes. Judicial and lawyer discipli-
nary processes differ as to tribunal, standards of conduct, and the public
office involved. Rules specifying which body has jurisdiction and when that
jurisdiction attaches should be promulgated by the court. Failure to resolve
these conflicts will leave both disciplinary processes open to the uncertain-
ties of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and may subject the judge, whose
conduct is in question, to multiple proceedings. The public should be aware
that both agencies exist and of the function of each. See Standard 7.12.
3.2 Jurisdiction Over Former Judge. The lawyer disciplinary agency
should have jurisdiction over a lawyer who is no longer a judge with
reference to allegedly unethical conduct that occurred during or prior
to the time when the lawyer held judicial office, provided such con-
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duct has not been the subject of judicial disciplinary proceedings as to
which a final determination has been made by the court.
Commentary
The Supreme Court of Florida held in Florida Bar v. McCain, 330
So.2d 712 (Fla. 1976), that a sitting judge is still an attorney at law and may
be subject to discipline by the bar after his tenure as judge ends. In contrast,
a lawyer in California who becomes a judge is thereby excluded from
membership in the State Bar. Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code Section 6002. The
interrelationship of lawyer and judge discipline presents a different problem
in such a state.
Action by the commission or the court resulting in voluntary resignation
or retirement should not be a bar to further action by the lawyer disciplinary
agency for the same conduct. This is true unless, on motion of the court or
application of the judge, and after notice and opportunity to be heard is
given to the lawyer disciplinary board, the court orders that the lawyer
disciplinary board not proceed further.
3.3 Grounds. Grounds for discipline should include:
(a) Conviction of a felony;
(b) Willful misconduct in office;
(c) Willful misconduct which, although not related to judicial duties,
brings the judicial office into disrepute;
(d) Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice or conduct
unbecoming a judicial officer, whether conduct in office or out-
side of judicial duties, that brings the judicial office into disre-
pute;
(e) Any conduct that constitutes a violation of the codes of judicial
conduct or professional responsibility.
Commentary
These grounds establish jurisdiction for the commission to investigate
and to hold hearings. A function of the commission is to enforce the codes
of judicial conduct and professional responsibility. The grounds outlined in
the standards are a compilation of the various grounds relied upon in most of
the states. They include conduct related to judicial duties in violation of a
statute, rule, ordinance, or the codes of judicial conduct or professional
responsibility.
Standard 6.1 states that a conviction of a felony should be automatic
grounds for the court to suspend from office. Other crimes are covered
under Standards 3.3(d) and 6.2.
This standard provides that not only impropriety but also the appear-
ance of impropriety that brings the judicial office into disrepute may be a
basis for commission action. Willful misconduct has been construed to be
more serious than conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. See
Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal.3d 270, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 201, 515 P.2d 1 (1973), regarding the handling of this type of lesser
included offense. Conduct outside judicial duties may also reflect upon the
integrity of the judicial process.
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3.4 Proceedings Not Substitute for Appeal. In the absence of fraud,
corrupt motive, or bad faith, the commission should not take action
against a judge for making findings of fact, reaching a legal conclu-
sion, or applying the law as he understands it. Claims of error should
be left to the appellate process.
Commentary
The disciplinary process is not a substitute for an appeal. To allow the
disciplinary function to be confused with the decision-making function of
the judge would undermine judicial independence. Judges would be as
concerned with what is proper in the eyes of the disciplinary commission as
with what is justice in the cause. Many present practices and procedures are
the result of an innovative judge trying to do justice in the cause and
improve the administration of justice.
4 PROCEDURES PRIOR TO FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE
4.1 Initiation of Procedure. An inquiry relating to conduct of a judge
may be initiated upon any reasonable basis.
Commentary
Oral or written complaints may be made by judges, lawyers, litigants,
court personnel, or members of the general public. They need not be made
in any specific form, nor need they be made under oath, but they must state
facts that, if true, would be grounds for discipline. Upon good cause and
upon its own motion, the commission may initiate an inquiry concerning any
judge.
Complaints submitted anonymously should not be disregarded. Law-
yers, court personnel, or litigants may fear retaliation of a kind not insulated
against in the immunity provision (Standard 4.2), and therefore refrain from
bringing misconduct to the attention of the commission unless it is possible
to do so anonymously. If the complainant is unknown or is unwilling or
unable to sign a sworn complaint pursuant to Standard 4.15, the statement of
allegations should be prepared as if the commission had proceeded on its
own motion.
Reports in the news media relating to the conduct of a judge may form
the basis for an inquiry by the commission. Reports or records required by
law or court rule to be filed or kept by a judge may form the basis for inquiry
by the commission.
4.2 Absolute Privilege. A complaint submitted to the commission or its
staff or testimony related to the complaint should be absolutely
privileged, and no civil action predicated on the complaint may be
instituted against any complainant or witness, or their counsel.
Commentary
It is crucial to the proper and effective functioning of the commission
that persons with information about judicial misconduct cooperate with the
investigations into those matters, and that persons feel free to bring matters
to the attention of the commission for further action. Cooperation will not
be forthcoming unless some protection is afforded the complainants and
witnesses.
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Complaints should be granted an absolute privilege (Weiner v. Wein-
traub, 22 N.Y.2d 330, 292 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1968); Ramstead v. Morgan, 219
Or. 383, 347 P.2d 594 (1959)), rather than the less protective "qualified
privilege" adopted by some jurisdictions, waving immunity when the com-
plaint is filed with malice.
Immunity from civil action attaches only to communications made to
the commission or its staff. If the complainant or witness publicly discloses
the information, this immunity does not apply. Therefore, the complainant
or witness remains liable in a civil action if he publicly makes a false
allegation about a judge. In addition, a false allegation in a sworn complaint
will be subject to charges of criminal perjury whether made publicly or to
the commission or its staff.
The privilege granted is immunity from suit, and not privilege from
disclosure. See Standards 4.6 and 4.9, for standards relating to confidentiali-
ty and disclosure.
4.3 Unfounded Complaint. The commission should not encourage
frivolous or unfounded complaints.
4.4 Screening, Preliminary Investigation, and Evaluation. Upon receipt
of a complaint, report, or other information as to conduct that might
constitute grounds for discipline, the executive officer should con-
duct a prompt, discreet, and confidential investigation and evaluation.
Commentary
As noted in the commentary to Standard 2.8, the executive officer
should immediately consider each complaint to determine whether it de-
scribes a matter within the jurisdiction of the commission. If the matter is
within commission jurisdiction, the preliminary investigation should be con-
ducted with dispatch and inconspicuously, to avoid unnecessary embarrass-
ment to the judge and precipitous publicity. Persons contacted for informa-
tion should be asked to maintain confidentiality.
4.5 Discretionary Notice. Notice that a complaint has been made may
be given to the judge.
Commentary
The judge may be given notice at any time during the preliminary
proceedings when deemed appropriate, even before a preliminary evalua-
tion is initiated. As a matter of fact, in over 90 percent of the cases, this
notice should be given. In addition, under Standard 4.16, the commission
must notify the judge after a finding of sufficient cause to proceed.
Notice that a complaint has been made should be delayed if the com-
plaint does not allege facts within the jurisdiction of the commission, or if
the identity of the complainant could be readily determined by the judge
from the nature of the complaint, causing possible reprisals. Notice should
be delayed if the nature of the complaint is such that notice to the judge may
enable him to destroy evidence. If the complaint is determined to be frivol-
ous or unfounded, the judge need not be notified.
The identity of complainants, where known, need not be disclosed
pending preliminary evaluation. It is possible that the identity of the person
or persons who brought the alleged misconduct to the attention of the
I I
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commission might never be disclosed, if the matter is disposed of before
probable cause has been determined, or if a statement of allegations is
prepared as if the commission proceeded on its own motion and the person
is not a witness.
4.6 Confidentiality. All proceedings should be confidential until there
has been a determination of probable cause and formal charges have
been filed.
Commentary
In the initial stages of the disciplinary case confidentiality is of
paramount concern. The judge has an interest in confidentiality to protect
his reputation from unfounded charges. The complainant's interest is to be
protected from possible recriminations for filing his complaint. The respon-
sibility of the commission is to protect the reputation of the judge and the
integrity of the judicial process from frivolous or unfounded charges, and to
be able to investigate fully charges of misconduct with the full cooperation
of others.
After the commission determines there is probable cause and formal
charges have been filed, the policy emphasis shifts from confidentiality to
the public's right to know. The integrity of the judicial system is better
protected by an open public hearing than by a closed hearing which may
raise questions concerning the credibility of the proceedings. This is particu-
larly true in those instances where the conduct is publicly known and the
commission proceedings are subject to rumor and speculation. Once a
finding of probable cause has been made, there is no longer a danger that the
charges are frivolous. It is no longer necessary to protect the identity of the
witnesses since the judge is entitled to that information through discovery.
(See Standard 5.7). Furthermore, evidence received at the public hearing is
subject to public inspection as in any other court proceeding.
4.7 Enforcement of Confidentiality. A procedure for enforcing confi-
dentiality should be established.
Commentary
Either the commission or the court should investigate allegations of
breach of confidentiality and decide whether sanctions should be imposed.
Sanctions are appropriate since Standard 2.9 prohibits resort to private law
suits for breaches of confidentiality. Jurisdictions can provide for contempt
of court as a sanction for breach of confidentiality. Kansas Rule 607 (1973);
Minn. Rule 5 (2) (1973); N. Mex. Rule 7 (c) (1968, as amended 1975); Penn.
Rule 1 (c) (1969); Wyo. Rule 7 (a) (1973).
4.8 Judge's Waiver. The judge may waive his right to confidentiality
prior to a finding of probable cause.
Commentary
The judge may waive confidentiality voluntarily. If he is aware of an
investigation, or if information about the matter becomes publicly known
from outside sources, the judge may wish to have certain issues clarified by
authorizing the commission to reveal information about the case. The com-
mission's power is described in Standard 4.9.
APPENDIX: PROPOSED STANDARDS 213
4.9 Public Statements by Commission. In any case in which the subject
matter becomes public, through independent sources or through a
waiver of confidentiality by the judge, the commission may issue
statements as it deems appropriate in order to confirm the pendency
of the investigation, to clarify the procedural aspects of the discipli-
nary proceedings, to explain the right of the judge to a fair hearing
without prejudgment, and to state that the judge denies the allega-
tions.
Commentary
Occasionally, the news media will be the first to uncover alleged judi-
cial misconduct and will publicize it widely. In other cases, a complainant or
the judge himself may make disclosures. Under these circumstances the
commission on its own motion or at the request of the judge may issue a
clarifying statement. The statement should explain that the commission is
aware of the allegations, that it is carrying out its responsibilities for inves-
tigating the complaint, that the judge is entitled to due process, and that, if
probable cause is found, a public hearing will be conducted.
4.10 Disclosure for Judicial Selection, Appointment or Assignment. If in
connection with the selection or appointment of judges, any state or
federal agency seeks information or written materials from the com-
mission concerning that judge, information may be divulged in ac-
cordance with procedures prescribed by the court, including rea-
sonable notice to the judge affected, unless the judge signs a waiver.
If in connection with the assignment of a retired judge to judicial
duties, any appropriate authority seeks information or written mate-
rials from the commission about that judge, information may be
divulged in accordance with procedures prescribed by the court,
including reasonable notice to the judge affected, unless the judge
signs a waiver.
Commentary
Judicial nominating commissions are charged with the important func-
tion of recruiting, investigating, and interviewing candidates for judicial
office. Other authorities have the ability to assign a retired judge to judicial
duties. In order to be effective, they must acquire as much relevant informa-
tion about potential judicial officers as possible. Certainly, information
about a judge's behavior is important. For those situations in which the
information is requested without the knowledge of the affected judge, the
judge should be given notice of the request and the intended disclosure,
before the information is released. Such a provision is in keeping with the
principle that data pertaining to an individual should not be disseminated
without his knowledge, and without providing him an opportunity to re-
spond to the notice of disclosure. To protect this right of the judge, the
nominating or appointing authorities should comply with rules established
by the court to receive access to information in the possession of the
commission.
This disclosure is also authorized whenever the affected judge signs a
waiver.
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4.11 Information Concerning Insufficient Cause. If the inquiry was initi-
ated as a result of notoriety or because of conduct that is a matter of
public record, information concerning the insufficient cause to pro-
ceed should be released by the commission.
Commentary
A judge that has been subjected to public scrutiny for conduct that is a
matter of public record and has had an inquiry by the commission started as
a result of it, should be relieved of the burden that this causes if the
commission concludes that it lacks probable cause to proceed further. The
public shares the judge's interest in being given this information. Therefore,
this is a sufficient reason to make an exception to the confidentiality rule.
4.12 Notice of Insufficient Cause to Proceed. Upon determination that
there is insufficient cause to proceed, the complainant, if any, should
be notified. If the judge has been informed of the proceeding, he
should also be notified of its termination, and the file should be
closed.
Commentary
The complainant who has filed a complaint with the commission but is
unaware of the disposition of that complaint may conclude that the commis-
sion's silence after receipt of the complaint is evidence of its desire to
protect the judge. It is in the best interests of the commission to reveal that it
has investigated and reviewed the information and has determined that there
is insufficient cause to proceed.
Since the matter did not go to a probable cause hearing, the information
contained in the file remains confidential, but is retained by the commission.
As discussed in Standard 4.13, the information contained in the closed file
may be used for limited purposes in subsequent disciplinary and disability
retirement proceedings against the judge.
4.13 Use of Closed File. A closed file may be referred to by the commis-
sion in subsequent proceedings.
Commentary
Standard 6.6 outlines the types of dispositions that the commission may
make after a complaint has been filed and prior to a public hearing. With any
of those dispositions t1e file will be closed. That file may be referred to
again in limited circumstances.
1) Where there has been a finding of insufficient cause to proceed, the
file may be referred to at a subsequent proceeding that raises the similar
allegations against the judge. The file would be used to exonerate the judge
where the complaint is based upon the same factual situation, and it would
be made a part of a new investigation where the complaint is based upon a
similar occurrence.
2) The file may be referred to after an informal adjustment if the judge
fails to refrain from acting in the manner that caused the prior complaint to
be filed. For example, the judge charged with failure to maintain judicial
temperament may have been admonished by the commission prior to a filing
of formal charges that his conduct is or may be cause for discipline. If, after
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being admonished, another complaint is filed stating the same charge based
upon other facts that are proven true at the public hearing, the prior file may
be used as evidence to show that the problem is a continuing one and not just
a rare occurrence.
3) The file may be referred to in connection with a decision as to the
recommended sanction to be imposed, whether the sanction is imposed
following a subsequent related or unrelated complaint.
4.14 Determination of Sufficient Cause. After a thorough investigation
and evaluation, the executive officer should determine whether there
is sufficient cause to proceed to a probable cause hearing.
Commentary
The decision to proceed to a probable cause hearing is made by the
executive officer. It is made after a full confidential investigation has been
conducted and an evaluation is made of all facts, information, and material
collected. It should be noted that a determination of insufficient cause to
proceed by the executive officer is reviewed by the full commission period-
ically. Standard 2.8 requires the executive officer to regularly report to the
full commission the disposition of information received. Any matter dis-
missed that the commission determines should be further investigated may
be reopened at that time by direction of the commission. The likelihood of a
revival of a case on this basis is minimal.
4.15 Sworn Complaint. After investigation and evaluation, if it appears
that there is sufficient cause to proceed, the commission should ask
the complainant to file a detailed sworn complaint against the judge.
When a sworn complaint is not obtained, a clear statement of the
allegations against the judge and the alleged facts forming their basis
should be prepared by the executive officer. Where more than one act
of misconduct is alleged, each should be clearly set forth.
Commentary
Occasionally, a complainant is unwilling or unable to cooperate with the
commission, or, indeed, may be the media. In those instances, the commis-
sion may authorize its executive officer to serve as the complainant by filing
a statement of the allegations against the judge. Whether the complaint is
sworn to a statement of allegations by the complainant or is filed by the
executive officer, the judge should be able to ascertain quickly the constitu-
tional, statutory, or disciplinary code provisions alleged to have been vio-
lated; although failure to cite the particular provision is not necessarily a
violation of due process. In re Dindoidge, 337 A.2d 885 (Pa. 1975).
4.16 Service of Sworn Complaint. The judge should be served promptly
with a copy of the sworn complaint or statement of allegations.
4.17 Right to Counsel. The judge should be entitled to counsel of his own
choice.
Commentary
While the judge has an absolute right to counsel of his own choice at all
stages of the proceeding, it is inappropriate for the judge, thereafter, to hear
matters in which his counsel appears; at least until considerable time has
216 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
passed between the commission proceedings and the appearance. When it
happens, the judge should disqualify himself.
If the attorney is an active trial lawyer, or if the size of the bar in areas
served by the court is limited, the court calendar can be seriously affected.
Further, whenever the judge hears a case in which his counsel appears,
whether or not recusal is expected, opposing counsel and his clients are
likely to have understandable doubts regarding the judge's impartiality. It is
desirable, where arrangements can be made, for counsel to be chosen from
among attorneys whose practice is not in the same locale as the court over
which the judge presides. Where possible, bar associations should exchange
information with judges in neighboring districts about the availability of
their members for service in commission proceedings.
4.18 Subpoenas and Discovery. The judge and the commission should
each be entitled to compel by subpoena the attendance and testimony
of witnesses, including the judge as witness, and to provide for the
inspection of documents, books, accounts, and other records.
Commentary
At any stage in a proceeding, the commission, its individual members,
or authorized staff should, in the conduct of investigations and hearings,
have the power of subpoena.
4.19 Power to Enforce Process. The power to enforce process may be
delegated by the court.
Commentary
The inherent power of the court is complete in this area, but it may
designate other courts to assist in the administration of certain functions
without any limitation on its own power. It also determines the place for
contesting process.
4.20 Response to Sworn Complaint. The commission should specify a
reasonable time within which the judge should respond in writing to
the charges. A personal appearance before the factfinder should be
permitted in lieu of or in addition to a written response. In the event
that the judge elects to appear personally, his statement should be
recorded.
Commentary
The commission should notify the judge promptly as to the time within
which he should respond. A copy of the rules of the commission should be
furnished to him at the same time. See Standard 2.6 for authority to promul-
gate rules.
The commission should cooperate with the judge as much as possible.
If the original notice to the judge is insufficient to enable him to prepare his
response, the commission should provide him with such additional informa-
tion as he requests, in as much detail as possible.
4.21 Termination after Response. The commission may terminate the
proceeding and dismiss the complaint following the response by the
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judge, or at any time thereafter, and should in that event give notice to
each complainant and to the judge that it has found insufficient cause
to proceed.
4.22 Amendment of Allegations. Amendment of the allegations prior to a
finding of probable cause may be permitted upon notice to the judge.
Commentary
Upon notice to the judge and provision of adequate time to prepare a
response, the commission should permit amendment of the allegations
against the judge at any time prior to a finding of probable cause.
4.23 Finding of Probable Cause. A finding of probable cause should
require the concurrence of a majority of commission members
present.
Commentary
The finding of probable cause by a majority of commission members
present is in contrast to Standard 5.23 where a majority concurrence by all
members of the commission is required for it to recommend discipline or
disability retirement to the court. This is, also, in contrast with the present
requirement in some states that a 2/3 vote of the entire commission is
required to find probable cause.
5 PROCEDURE AFTER FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE
5.1 Filing of Formal Statement of Charges. When probable cause is
found, the commission should file with the executive officer a formal
statement of charges. Confidentiality ceases upon this filing.
Commentary
The formal statement of charges is a public document. It should be
drawn with clarity and specificity. From it the judge should be able to
ascertain the allegations and provision of the applicable codes alleged to be
violated. The formal statement of charges need not be identical to the sworn
complaint or statement of allegations obtained under Standard 4.15. The
allegations may have been amended under Standard 4.22, or the commission
may have determined insufficient cause to proceed on certain allegations.
5.2 Service of Formal Charges. The judge should be served promptly
with a copy of the formal statement of charges.
5.3 Judge's Response. The judge should respond to the formal state-
ment of charges within the time specified.
Commentary
The judge should be required to answer the formal charges as a part of
his duty as a public official. The answer may be in any form recognized by
the rules of civil procedure of the jurisdiction. Commission rules should
prescribe the time for response and other time intervals. Lack of an answer
by the judge does not relieve the commission of the responsibility to estab-
lish its case by clear and convincing evidence (Standard 5.17), but may be
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taken into account by the commission in the formulation of its findings.
Admissions may be obtained from the judge, who may be deposed (Standard
4.18) prior to the filing of formal charges.
5.4 Preparation for Hearing. The judge should be afforded ample op-
portunity to prepare for the hearing.
5.5 Scheduling and Notice. A hearing should be held without undue
delay, and the judge and all counsel should be notified of the sched-
uled time and place.
Commentary
Where the rules for judicial disciplinary proceedings do not otherwise
specify, the type and form of notice, and the determination of the hearing
date should be governed by the rules of civil procedure of the jurisdiction.
Commission rules should prescribe time for response, and other time inter-
vals.
5.6 Time Limit on Discovery. The commission should provide by rule
for time limits on discovery.
5.7 Discovery. The judge and the commission should be entitled to
discovery to the extent available in civil or criminal proceedings,
whichever is broader.
Commentary
Counsel for the commission should disclose to the judge all material
including, but not limited to, relevant medical and other reports, books,
accounts and records in the possession of the commission, without need for
discovery. Names and addresses of persons known by the commission to
have relevant information should be disclosed. If the judge seeks disclosure
of names and addresses of persons which the commission believes is unwar-
ranted, a motion to compel disclosure may be made in the court or in such
court as it may designate. The court may grant, deny, limit or defer the
disclosure sought. If, at any time during the pendency of the proceedings,
the commission becomes aware of additional material or witnesses subject
to discovery or inspection, the judge should be informed promptly and given
adequate opportunity for preparation.
Discovery is a two-way street. Both the judge and the commission
should be allowed wide discovery in order to prepare the case. Formal
hearings can be expedited through broad discovery. Errant judges may
retire or resign rather than proceed to formal hearings when they know what
can and will be proved at the hearing.
5.8 Subpoena and Inspection. The judge and the commission should
each be entitled to compel by subpoena the attendance and testimony
of witnesses, including the judge as witness, and to provide for the
inspection of documents, books, accounts, and other records.
Commentary
The power of subpoena should be available at all stages of the proceed-
ings (See Standard 4.18). The judge and the commission should be able to
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gather evidence from a variety of sources in order to prepare and present the
matter thoroughly.
5.9 Public Hearing. The formal hearing should be public and conducted
before the factfinder, which may be the whole commission, three-
member hearing panels appointed by the chairman, or a master or
referee appointed by the court.
Commentary
In jurisdictions where there are too many hearings to be handled by the
full commission, the use of three-member hearing panels is recommended.
The composition of the hearing panel should reflect the composition of the
commission, i.e., a judge, a lawyer, and a public member. No commission
member who conducts the investigation of the matter should serve on the
hearing panel, or with the commission in considering this matter. He should
be replaced by an alternate. In the more populous states, conducting hear-
ings by a referee or master may be the only way the commission can keep up
with the number of formal charges. This is not recommended, but is recog-
nized as a necessity upon occasion. Retired judges may be used for this
purpose. Appointment of full-time active judges as referees or masters is not
recommended as it will interfere with the performance of judicial duties and
cause delays in the administration of justice. See In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303
(Alas. 1975), where use of a master was acceptable.
5.10 Presiding Officer. The person designated to preside at a hearing
should be either a judge or a lawyer who is familiar with ruling on
motions and admission of evidence.
5.11 Rules of Evidence and Due Process. In the hearing all testimony
should be under oath, the rules of evidence applicable to civil pro-
ceedings in the jurisdiction should apply, and the judge should be
accorded due process of law.
Commentary
The proceeding should be conducted in a dignified manner and in
accordance with usual courtroom decorum. The rules of civil procedure
adopted in that jurisdiction apply in the absence of a commission rule.
5.12 Presentation of Matter. An attorney or attorneys of the commission
staff, or special counsel retained for the purpose, should present the
matter to the factfinder.
Commentary
Presentation should be by an attorney so that the requirements of
compliance with the rules of evidence and the rules of procedure of the
commission can be met.
5.13 Burden of Proof. The commission has the burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence the facts justifying action.
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Commentary
The judge is not required to present affirmative evidence in his own
defense, but he has the burden of proof with respect to affirmative defenses.
The judge may claim the Fifth Amendment right to refuse to testify. Courts,
however, have held that he may be removed from judicial office for failing
to explain the conduct in question. Napolitano v. Ward, 457 F.2d 279 (7th
Cir. 1972); In re Melvin H. Osterman, 13 N.Y.2d (a-r) (Ct. on Jud., 1963).
5.14 Cross-examination and Evidence. The judge should be permitted to
adduce evidence and produce and cross-examine witnesses, subject
to the rules of evidence applicable to civil proceedings in the state.
Commentary
The judge responding to a statement of charges at a hearing should have
all of the rights accorded to parties in a civil proceeding. The attorney
representing the judge should have the right to call witnesses in behalf of the
judge, to examine adverse witnesses, and to present all relevant arguments.
5.15 Medical Privilege. The raising of mental or physical condition as a
defense constitutes a waiver of medical privilege.
Commentary
The commission may order a mental or physical examination for the
judge at any time the judge raises mental or physical condition as a defense.
Standard 8.6. If the judge claims present inability to assist in the preparation
of his defense, interim suspension pursuant to Standard 6.2 is warranted.
5.16 Amending Allegations. By leave of the commission or by consent of
the judge, the statement of charges may be amended after commence-
ment of the hearing only if the amendment is technical in nature and
the judge and his counsel are given adequate time to prepare a re-
sponse.
Commentary
Procedural due process requires that the judge receive fair notice of the
allegations. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117,
rehearing denied, 391 U.S. 961, 88 S.Ct. 1833, 20 L.Ed.2d 874 (1968); Bar
Association of Baltimore County v. Cockrell, 270 Md. 686, 313 A.2d 816
(1974).
5.17 Standard of Proof. Formal charges should be established by clear
and convincing evidence.
Commentary
Most jurisdictions already follow the "clear and convincing evidence"
test, e.g., In re Rome, 542 P.2d 676 (Kan. 1975); Geiler v. Commission on
Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal.3d 270, 110 Cal. Rptr. 201, 515 P.2d 1 (1973);
In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303 (Alas. 1975); In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 241 So.
2d 469 (1970); In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 304 A.2d 587 (1973). Most have
done so by judicial decision rather than through constitutional or statutory
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provisions or rule of court. In re Hagerty, 257 La. 1, 24 So. 2d 469 (1970); In
re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 304 A.2d 587 (1973).
In Matter of Formal Inquiry Concerning Heuerman, 240 N.W.2d 603
(S.D. 1976) the court said:
"The first issue we consider is appropriate standard of proof in
proceedings under the Act. We note that it would be inapposite to
require proof 'beyond a reasonable doubt' as this is not a criminal
prosecution. Proof by a mere preponderance of the evidence is also
inapposite because of the severity of the sanction which can be
imposed. We conclude that the proper standard of proof is by
'clear and convincing evidence.' Such a standard provides ade-
quate protection for the party subject to charges, but at the same
time does not demand so much evidence that the ability of the
Commission and this court to effectively oversee the judiciary is
impaired."
5.18 Record of Proceedings. Every hearing should be reported verbatim.
Commentary
If the commission makes a recommendation to the court, the court will
need the transcript in order to make its decision. If the hearing is before a
panel or before a referee or master, the commission will need the complete
record in order for it to make its report and recommendation to the court.
Any method for court recording approved in the state may be employed.
5.19 Submission by Factfinder. The factfinder should submit to the com-
mission the record, the report, and the transcripts of testimony, and
the commission may act thereon as if the hearing had been before the
whole commission.
Commentary
The commission should make an independent evaluation of the facts
presented. In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303 (Alas. 1975); Geiler v. Commission on
Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal. 3d 270, 110 Cal. Rptr. 201, 515 P.2d 1 (1973).
5.20 Objections to Findings. Counsel for the judge and commission may
submit written objections to the findings and recommendations.
Commentary
A time limit should be established by court rule affecting the ability of
counsel to object to the findings and recommendations of the factfinder. As
elsewhere in these standards, the rules of civil procedure should be followed
absent a more specific rule by the court.
5.21 Scope of Commission Review. The commission should reach a deci-
sion on the basis of the record.
Commentary
The decision should be based solely on evidence presented to the
commission at the hearing. The commission should exclude from its con-
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sideration any information acquired in the preliminary stages of investiga-
tion.
5.22 Prompt Action. The commission should render its decision prompt-
ly after the hearing. It has the right to substitute its findings for that of
the factfinder.
Commentary
The judge and the public have the right to a prompt determination of all
matters before the commission. The commission should have its hearing and
make its recommendation within 90 days from the finding of probable cause,
or 90 days from the interim suspension, whichever is earlier.
5.23 Recommendation for Discipline. A recommendation for discipline
should be reported to the court only if concurred in by a majority of
all members of the commission.
Commentary
Any recommendation for discipline should be concurred in not only by
a majority of those present, but by a majority of all commission members.
This is a different requirement than that which is recommended for deter-
mining probable cause pursuant to Standard 4.23. Alternate members should
serve with the commission any time a member is either disqualified or
cannot attend the commission meeting. Standard 7.1 requires that a notice of
this determination should be given to the judge prior to filing the recom-
mendation with the court.
5.24 Dissent. Any dissent should be transmitted with the majority deci-
sion.
Commentary
'the court should receive any minority opinion at the same time it
receives the majority determination. This report should also be given to the
judge and his counsel and be made a part of the public record.
5.25 Dismissal by the Commission. If a majority of the members of the
commission fail to concur in a recommendation for discipline, the
matter is dismissed.
Commentary
All parties to the proceeding should receive notice when the commis-
sion dismisses an action before it. The complainant may appeal this decision
to the court if the rules of civil procedure in the jurisdiction permit it.
5.26 Awarding of Witness Expense. The expense of witnesses should be
borne by the party that calls them unless:
a) Physical or mental disability of the judge is in issue, then the
commission should reimburse the judge for the reasonable expense of
the witnesses whose testimony related to the disability; or
b) The judge has been exonerated of the charges against him, then the
court may determine that the imposition of costs and expert witness
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fees will work a financial hardship or injustice upon him and order that
those fees be reimbursed.
Commentary
The judge should be reimbursed for reasonable witness expenses in two
situations: (1) when disability is an issue, and (2) when he is exonerated and
has suffered substantial financial hardship. Reimbursement is for the full
witness expense, i.e., the charge for the services rendered, and not merely
fees. The "reasonable" criteria for the reimbursement applies both to the
amount of the expense, and to the number of witnesses. Standard 6.7 allows
costs to be assessed as a sanction; thus, reimbursing the judge who is
exonerated is equitable when those costs will cause him to suffer financial
hardship or injustice.
5.27 Witness Fees. All witnesses should receive fees and expenses in
accordance with the standard procedure in effect in the state.
Commentary
There is no reason to distinguish the treatment of witnesses in matters
of judicial discipline or disability retirement from that in any other kind of
judicial proceeding.
5.28 Transcript Cost. A transcript of all proceedings should be provided
to the judge without cost.
5.29 Costs of Proceedings. Costs of all proceedings should be at public
expense.
Commentary
The expenses of the commisison, including staff salaries, its expert
witnesses, mental or physical examinations it requests or directs, prepara-
tion of its documents, and the service of process are all proper items for
public expense. The judge's attorney's fees should not be at public expense.
In addition, Standards 6.7 and 5.27 recognize that assessing costs is a
possible sanction.
6 DISPOSITIONS AND SANCTIONS
6.1 Suspension for Felony. A judge should be suspended immediately
by the court without necessity of commission action, upon the filing
of an indictment or information charging him with a felony under state
or federal law. Such suspension should not preclude action by the
commission with respect to the conduct which was the basis for the
felony charge, before or after a conviction, acquittal, or other disposi-
tion of the felony charge.
Commentary
The integrity of the judicial system demands prompt action whenever a
sitting judge has been formally charged with a felony. Consequently, it is
recommended that the court bypass the normal commission procedure and
act directly to suspend the judge, with pay, pending final determination of
charges. Such action would occur only if the judge is charged with a felony
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under federal statutes or under the statutes of the state in which he is
serving. A judge charged with conduct which constitutes a felony in another
state but does not constitute a felony in the state in which he is serving may
be subjected to interim suspension upon petition of the commission.
The interim suspension should not be allowed to continue indefinitely,
but should be brought to resolution by formal disciplinary action. The
commission should promptly conduct a hearing at which the sole issue is the
ultimate discipline to be imposed. The ultimate discipline imposed will not
be adjusted even if the criminal court judgment is reversed in an appellate
proceeding. In fact, if a judgment of conviction is reversed in an appellate
proceeding, the disciplinary proceeding should not be reopened. In re Hag-
gerty, supra.
If a judge is subsequently found not guilty of the charges, or a guilty
finding is reversed and dismissed on appeal, the order of interim suspension,
if still in effect, should be vacated. This should not preclude independent
proceedings by the commission since the standard of proof for judicial
discipline requires only clear and convincing evidence. Thus, conduct which
may not be established beyond a reasonable doubt to prove criminal charges
may be sustainable and proved under the clear and convincing evidence test
and may serve as a basis for imposing discipline against the judge.
6.2 Suspension for Misdemeanor. Conduct resulting in the filing of mis-
demeanor charges against a judge, if it adversely affects his ability to
perform the duties of his office, may be grounds for immediate
suspension with pay by the court, without necessity of commission
action. A conviction, acquittal or other disposition on a misdemeanor
charge, should not preclude action by the commission with reference
to the conduct upon which the charge was based.
Commentary
Conduct that brings the judicial office into disrepute may have such a
harmful effect on the integrity of the judicial system as to require immediate
interim suspension of the judge. This standard is permissive rather than
directive; it allows greater discretion to the court in imposing the suspen-
sion. Interim suspension will be vacated and ultimate discipline will be
determined as described in the commentary to Standard 6.1.
6.3 Misdemeanor Suspension Review. Any judge suspended under the
provision of Standard 6.2 should be given a prompt hearing and
determination by the court upon his application to review the interim
suspension order.
Commentary
Since interim suspension is discretionary for misdemeanors, the judge
is given the opportunity to seek review of the interim suspension, a remedy
not provided in cases of interim suspension where felony charges are in-
volved.
6.4 Interim Suspension. Interim suspension, with pay, pending final
decision as to ultimate discipline, may be ordered by the court.
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Commentary
There are instances when a judge's conduct does not violate a statute
but does bring the judicial office into disrepute. If that conduct becomes
notorious through mention in the press or by other public exposure it
becomes necessary for the court to act to maintain public confidence in the
judiciary. At those times it may be appropriate for the court to order an
interim suspension, with pay, pending a final decision as to ultimate disci-
pline. This action must be weighed against the fact that if the judge has been
suspended on an interim basis, the efficient operation of courts will suffer
from the judge's prolonged absence from official duties.
6.5 Disability Suspension. A judge who claims that a physical or mental
disability prevents his assisting in the preparation of his defense to the
charges should be placed on interim suspension, with pay. Once an
interim suspension has been imposed, there should be a determination
of whether in fact there is such a disability. If there is such a disabili-
ty, the judge should be retired. If there is a finding of no disability, the
disciplinary proceeding should then continue.
Commentary
When a judge raises physical or mental disability as an affirmative
defense to charges that, if proved, would result in his being disciplined, it is
important that he not remain on the bench. This would serve to damage
public confidence in the judiciary. It would be better to suspend that judge,
with pay, until it could be determined that his claim of disability is factual. If
it is, the judge should be retired. If it is not, the disciplinary proceeding
should be recommenced.
6.6 Dispositions. The commission may make any of the following dis-
positions:
(a) An unjustified or unfounded complaint may be privately dis-
missed by the commission without giving notice to the judge;
(b) The commission may issue a private reprimand;
(c) The commission may by informal adjustment dispose of a com-
plaint by:
(1) Informing or admonishing the judge that his conduct is
or may be cause for discipline;
(2) Directing professional counseling and assistance for
the judge; or
(3) Imposing conditions on a judge's conduct.
Commentary
Unfounded and unjustified complaints represent a large portion of
those received by judicial discipline and disability retirement commissions.
There is no need to burden the records or the judge with such complaints.
Each complaint, even though unjustified or unfounded, should be acknow-
ledged by the commission.
The sanctions include a variety of methods for dealing with improper
judicial conduct by informal adjustment. The type of conduct for which
these would be appropriate would not ordinarily merit full and formal
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hearings. A listing of these sanctions is not meant to be exclusive but rather
to establish guidelines for informal procedures when appropriate.
These informal adjustments, except for private reprimand, may be
employed even after a hearing, though they are primarily intended for use
prior to a formal hearing.
Occasionally a judge will be guilty of misconduct through inadvertence
or a lack of understanding as to the high ethical demands of the code of
judicial conduct. Sometimes the fact that the commission has brought a
judge's behavior to his attention will be sufficient to induce him to avoid
such conduct in the future.
Occasionally the conduct complained of is of an involuntary nature,
unlike that referred to in Standard 3.3, and the judge may need professional
counseling or other assistance in order to regain effective control over his
behavior. On other occasions, further guidance in how to carry out his
judicial duties more effectively may be called for.
The commission may recommend that the judge avoid certain conduct
that appears to be questionable. If, for example, the judge is having a
drinking problem the commission may impose a condition that the judge
attend an alcohol treatment program, or that he refrain from the use of
alcoholic beverages during the day, or altogether.
When an informal adjustment or private reprimand is used, it should be
conditioned upon the judge acknowledging that he is aware that he is
waiving his right to a hearing. The informal adjustment or private reprimand
should not serve as a bar to further proceedings based on similar misconduct
or conduct of a different nature that together with the prior conduct would
have a negative cumulative effect upon the judge's integrity or the appear-
ance of fair and impartial behavior. By consenting to the informal adjust-
ment or private reprimand the judge is making a knowing waiver of his right
to object to the findings that are the basis for this disposition being used
against him at a subsequent hearing and in subsequent impositions of disci-
pline. The judge should be fully advised by the commission that the result of
the acceptance of private dispositions is the waiving of these rights. There-
fore, the judge should be required to accept an informal adjustment or
private reprimand in writing.




(c) Imposing discipline as an attorney;
(d) Imposing limitations or conditions on the performance of judicial
duties;
(e) Reprimand or censure;
(f) Imposing a fine;
(g) Assessment of costs and expenses;
(h) Imposing any combination of the above sanctions.
Commentary
Removal is the most serious sanction available under judicial discipline.
Its use represents the decision that the conduct which resulted in this
discipline was of a nature that it seriously damaged the judge's ability to
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perform in judicial functions. It should be treated as an exceptional sanction
used only on rare occasions.
The court should also have the authority to retire a judge involuntarily if
the judge refuses to retire voluntarily. The difference between removal and
involuntary retirement is that the judge might retain pension rights through
involuntary retirement. Involuntary retirement should not be used as a
substitute for removal. It should be used for conduct that is not willful, but
caused by physical or mental disability.
Some misconduct is so serious that the judge should not only be re-
moved from judicial office but also be disbarred or suspended from the
practice of law. These standards do not recommend automatic disbarment
every time a judge is removed from office. Standard 7.12 establishes a
system to allow the lawyer disciplinary board to intervene before the court
in those cases which might result in removal.
The commission may recommend that the court control the assignment
of the judge's judicial duties and the kinds of cases he be assigned, or put
conditions upon his continuance in office. This is an application of the
court's inherent power in judicial administration. See In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d
565 (Fla. 1970); and In Re Lee, 336 So.2d 1175 (Fla. 1976).
The commission may recommend that the court issue a public repri-
mand or censure. A reprimand or censure can deter not only the judge in the
immediate case, but also other judges, encouraging them to avoid similar
conduct.
An appropriate intermediate sanction between reprimand or censure
and removal is the imposition of a fine. Apart from interim suspension, the
standards do not recommend suspension of a judge without pay. Suspension
punishes the judge's colleagues because they must carry an extra burden
during the suspension. The imposition of a fine should take the place of that
sanction. A fine has the same financially punitive effect upon the judge, but
does not create backlog problems. Like removal, the imposition of a fine
will require constitutional authority.
Whenever a judge is found guilty of misconduct, the commission may
recommend that the court tax the costs and expenses of the proceedings to
the judge. This might include actual costs of the proceedings. As in Standard
5.20, "expense" means the actual charge for services, not merely fees.
7 PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT
7.1 Filing and Service. The commission should, at the same time it files
its record, findings, and recommendations with the court, serve
copies upon the respondent judge. Proof of service should be filed.
7.2 Briefs. The court's appellate procedure with respect to filing of
briefs and the presentation of oral argument should be followed.
Commentary
The court's review of a commission recommendation for discipline
should be given priority. To expedite the submission of documents to the
court, it should, by rule, establish a strict timetable for the filing of the
commission's recommendations, findings of fact, and record, the respond-
ent's brief, if any, the commission's reply brief, if any, and, in accordance
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with Standard 7.12, the brief of the lawyer disciplinary agency. In the
absence of a specific rule, the rules of appellate procedure used in appeals
by right should be followed. The court should grant motions for extensions
of time only sparingly, and never as of right.
7.3 Prompt Consideration. Upon the filing of a recommendation for
discipline or disability retirement, the court should promptly docket
the matter for consideration.
Commentary
Prompt resolution of charges against judges is essential to the effective
administration of justice as well as to the integrity of the judiciary. These
cases should be given priority in scheduling by the court.
7.4 Obtaining Additional Findings. If the court desires an expansion of
the record or additional findings with respect either to the recom-
mendations for discipline or to the sanctions to be imposed, it should
remand the matter to the commission with appropriate directions,
retaining jurisdiction, and should hold the matter pending receipt of
the commission's filing of the additional record.
7.5 Supplementing the Record. The court without remand and prior to
the imposition of discipline may accept or solicit supplementary fi-
lings with respect to medical or other information, provided that the
parties have notice and an opportunity to be heard.
7.6 Additional Filings. The court may order additional filings or oral
argument as to specified issues or the entire matter.
Commentary
The court should not be limited in its ability to obtain all information
that would assist it in properly disposing of matters regarding judicial disci-
pline and disability retirement. It should have full authority to remand or
obtain supplementary filings by order or petition.
7.7 Delay for Further Proceedings. The court, on receipt of notice of an
additional proceeding before the commission involving the same
judge, may delay decision and hold the matter pending the commis-
sion's termination of this additional proceeding. In the event that
additional recommendations for discipline of the judge are filed, the
court may impose a single sanction covering all recommendations.
Commentary
On occasion more than one disciplinary proceeding may be pending
against the judge. The conduct being thus investigated may be related as
well as unrelated. It is more efficient for the court to consider all matters
pending when it considers imposing discipline upon a judge. In order to do
this the court should request that the commission advise the court if any-
thing else is pending. If so, the court should, on its own motion, delay
hearing the matter until all disciplinary proceedings have been concluded.
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7.8 Determination of Facts. The court should reach its own conclusion
as to the facts found by the commission and as to the recommendation
that discipline be imposed.
Commentary
The court should conduct an independent review of the facts found by
the commission, its conclusion that the facts constitute a violation of the
constitution, statute, ordinance, court rule, or codes of judicial conduct, or
professional responsibility, and its recommendation of a sanction to be
imposed.
7.9 Review on the Record. The court should make an independent
evaluation of the findings and recommendations of the commission.
Commentary
The court's power and discretion are final and absolute, as in matters of
attorney discipline.
The court does not serve as an appellate court in this kind of case. The
decision of the court should be upon the record made before the commis-
sion.
7.10 Standard of Proof. In issuing a reprimand or ordering discipline or
retirement of a judge, the court should rely only on facts that have
been established by clear and convincing evidence.
7.11 Imposition of Discipline. If the court determines that the imposition
of discipline is appropriate, it may impose the sanction recommended
by the commission or any other sanction it deems proper.
Commentary
The court determines the appropriate sanction to be imposed upon a
judge. Deference should be shown to the recommendations of the commis-
sion, but the court should not be bound by the recommendations. The
court's discretion is complete. It may impose a less severe (McCartney v.
Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 12 Cal. 3d 512, 526 P.2d 268 (1974)),
or a more severe sanction (In re Diener and Brocolino, 268 Md. 659, 304
A.2d 587 (1973); In re Robson, 500 P.2d 657 (Alas. 1972)) than that recom-
mended.
7.12 Interim Suspension. Upon a determination by the commission of a
judge's incompetence there should be an immediate interim suspen-
sion, with pay, pending a final disposition by the court.
Commentary
Effectiveness of the administration of justice and respect for the
judiciary require that when a judge is found to be mentally incompetent,
there be an immediate interim suspension with pay. This interim suspension
should be ordered by the court without need for commission recom-
mendation. See Standard 6.5 for a discussion of the sanction of interim
suspension when physical or mental disability is raised as an affirmative
defense.
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7.13 Consideration of Lawyer Discipline. The court, when considering
removal of a judge, should determine whether discipline as a lawyer
also is warranted. If removal is deemed appropriate by the court, it
should notify the judge and the lawyer disciplinary board and give
them an opportunity to be heard on the issue of the lawyer discipline,
if any, to be imposed.
Commentary
Misconduct by a judge which requires removal is so serious that the
lawyer disciplinary board should have the opportunity to recommend disbar-
ment or other discipline against the judge as a lawyer. When a judge is
removed from the bench, the lawyer disciplinary board should have the
opporturiity to be heard on the issue of lawyer discipline before he is
restored to practice. The judge should be aware of the possibility of this
further sanction, and be heard on the matter.
7.14 Charge Against Member of Court. A method should be established
for the designation of a substitute judicial panel to serve in the place
of the court when charges are brought against one of its members.
Commentary
The method may include the impaneling of judges of the intermediate
appellate court or senior trial judges or combinations thereof, to constitute a
court of the same number of members as comprise the court. This recom-
mendation is to protect against any appearance of favoritism that might arise
due to personal ties between the responding judge and his colleagues on the
court.
Such substitute review panels are authorized by constitutional amend-
ments in California (Cal. Const. art. VI, Sec. 18 (1976)), and Florida (Fla.
Const. art. V (1976)).
8 MENTAL OR PHYSICAL DISABILITY
8.1 Authority. The commission should have authority to receive infor-
mation, investigate, conduct hearings, and make recommendations to
the court relating to mental or physical disability of judges.
Commentary
The same commission that handles matters of judicial discipline should
handle matters of judicial disability. The procedures should be similar. Both
types of problems reflect upon the competence of the judiciary.
8.2 Procedure. In carrying out its responsibilities regarding physical or
mental disabilities, the commission should follow the same proce-
dures that it employs with respect to discipline for misconduct.
Commentary
The commission should follow the same procedures in this area as are
followed in the discipline of judges. Both types of cases will be initiated by
receiving information regarding a judge's behavior. In some cases, what
appears to be a matter for discipline will, upon investigation, turn out to be a
matter of disability.
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Attempts at informal resolution should also be made by the commis-
sion. Treatment, counseling, or other relevant arrangements should be sug-
gested prior to the filing of formal charges. A judge who has served long and
with distinction sometimes serves beyond his time. The commission should
be very careful about such a judge's reputation. The commission should try
informally to convince him that voluntary retirement would be in his own
best interests and that of the judiciary. The commission should attempt to
have the judge's family, friends or colleagues talk with him to help him make
a decision to retire voluntarily. Where this fails, the commission will have to
perform one of its most difficult functions.
8.3 Representation by Counsel. If the judge in a matter relating to phys-
ical or mental disability is not represented by counsel, the commission
should appoint an attorney to represent him at public expense.
Commentary
The judge should be represented by counsel in order to protect his
rights. A judge who is being proceeded against by the commission and who
appears to be physically or mentally unable to prepare his defense should
have counsel appointed by the commission.
8.4 Effect of Denial. If the complaint involves the physical or mental
condition of the judge, a denial of the alleged condition should consti-
tute a waiver of medical privilege and the judge should be required to
produce his medical records.
8.5 Medical Examination. If medical privilege is waived, the judge is
deemed to have consented to a physical or mental examination by a
qualified medical practitioner designated by the commission. The
report of the medical practitioner should be furnished to the commis-
sion and the judge.
8.6 Involuntary Retirement. A judge who refuses to retire voluntarily
may be involuntarily retired by the court.
8.7 Procedure for Involuntary Retirement. If attempts to convince a
judge to retire voluntarily fail, then the commission should proceed to
file a formal complaint, hold a public hearing, make findings of fact,
and present recommendations to the court.
8.8 Effect of Involuntary Retirement. A judge who is involuntarily re-
tired should be ineligible to perform judicial duties pending further
order of the court and may, upon order of the court, be transferred to
inactive status or indefinitely suspended from practicing law in the
jurisdiction.
Commentary
If a judge was involuntarily retired for a condition that subsequently
improves, he may petition the court for reassignment to judicial duties.
A judge who is involuntarily retired may at the same time be transferred
to inactive status or indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, if the
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condition leading to the retirement is such as to impair his ability to practice
law. The court has a responsibility to protect the public from incompetent
lawyers as well as from incompetent judges.
The imposition of lawyer discipline is discretionary because there are
situations in which an individual is no longer able to perform judicial duties,
but is fully competent to continue in the practice of law. Where the disability
is such that it would affect his ability to practice law, the court should
ordinarily transfer him to inactive status or suspend him indefinitely from
practicing law.
In states that have a unified bar, transfer to inactive status will be the
appropriate disposition. In voluntary bar states, the disposition will be
indefinite suspension from the practice of law. A disabled judge should not
be designated by the same label as a disciplined judge.
9 ADVISORY AGENCIES
9.1 Establishment of Advisory Committee. The court should establish
an advisory committee on the code of judicial conduct, which should
render advisory opinions to judges at their request or on its own
motion.
Commentary
The purpose of such a committee is to make judges aware of the scope
and meaning of the code of judicial conduct and of its practical application
to their activities.
9.2 Opinions Not Binding. Opinions of the advisory committee should
not be binding on the commission or on the court, but the commission
and the court should consider reliance by the judge upon the advisory
committee's opinion.
Commentary
The advisory committee should operate in a manner similar to the ethics
committee of the bar, which renders opinions to lawyers who desire expla-
nation of the code of professional responsibility.
Its opinions should be published and circulated to all judges. A judge's
good faith reliance upon an advisory committee opinion should be con-
sidered by the commission and by the court when the matter it addresses is
the subject of the disciplinary proceeding. The opinion may be admitted into
evidence in mitigation or, when appropriate, as a defense.
9.3 Composition. The advisory committee should be composed of
judges from the various levels of courts and lawyers. No member of
the advisory committee should serve on the commission.
Commentary
The advisory committee should be composed of persons knowledgeable
regarding the code of judicial conduct. Judges and lawyers should serve
together on this committee. There should not be any overlap of members
between the committee and the commission matters.
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9.4 National Clearinghouse. There should be a national clearinghouse
to provide information to all jurisdictions regarding judicial discipline
and disability retirement. The clearinghouse should be staffed by
persons who are knowledgeable in matters relating to judicial disci-
pline and disability and retirement, and are available to respond to
inquiries. The clearinghouse should maintain a brief and opinion
bank, along with other information concerning judicial discipline and
disability and retirement, and the operation of the various commis-
sions.
Commentary
In the growing and controversial field of judicial discipline, it is neces-
sary for judicial discipline authorities in the various jurisdictions to maintain
communication about their systems, problems, and progress. States should
budget funds to support the cost of maintaining a central repository for
matters relating to judicial discipline and disability and retirement, and a
staff that can assist all commissions. The clearinghouse can collect, main-
tain, and organize statistics as required in Standards 2.8 (f) and (g), and
perform consulting services. Copies of the promulgated rules of the various
jurisdictions, opinions and briefs relating to the field of judicial discipline
and disability, and other references can be collected and analyzed.
Historically, the American Judicature Society has done the most to
provide services in the field of judicial discipline and disability just as the
American Bar Association has provided a similar service regarding lawyer
discipline through its National Center for Professional Discipline.
The American Judicature Society recently announced that it has estab-
lished The Center for Judicial Conduct Organizations to serve the nation in
this capacity. It is recommended that funds provided for the clearinghouse
in each state be used to support the expanded work of the AJS. All opinions
in the field of judicial discipline and disability retirement should be sent to
the national clearinghouse and be made available to other jurisdictions upon
request.
10 STATEMENT ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY
10.1 (Title) A means for discipline for the federal judiciary should be
established.
Commentary
The federal judicial system should have an appropriate structure for the
discipline of federal judges. This can be accomplished through (1) limited
inherent power of the United States Supreme Court; (2) a constitutional
amendment; or (3) a congressional act.
With regard to the first alternative, the United States Supreme Court
does not have any constitutional authority to remove a judge from office but
it may by administrative order provide procedures for the investigation and
the discipline by reprimand and declination to assigned cases. This authority
is derived from the court's inherent power. The United States Supreme
Court also after investigation and due process recommends impeachment of
a judge to the Congress of the United States although it is doubtful the Court
would ever take this action. The view that the United States Supreme Court
has the inherent and implied power to discipline the federal judiciary is not
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widely accepted and particularly has not been indicated by those persons
most able to exercise this power, namely, the Justices of the United States
Supreme Court. Justices Douglas and Black, in a dissent, reflected what
may well be a majority opinion of the United States Supreme court when
they stated:
"An independent judiciary is one of this nation's outstanding
characteristics. Once a federal judge is confirmed by the Senate
and takes his oath, he is independent of every other judge. He
commonly works with other federal judges who are likewise
sovereign. But neither one alone nor any number banded together
can act as censor and place sanctions on him. Under the Constitu-
tion the only leverage that can be asserted against him is impeach-
ment . . . there is no power under our Constitution for one group
of federal judges to censor or discipline any federal judge. . . It is
time that an end be put to these efforts of federal judges to ride
herd on other federal judges. This is a form of 'hazing' having no
place under the Constitution. Federal judges are entitled, like other
people, to the full freedom of the First Amendment. If they break a
law, they can be prosecuted. If they become corrupt or sit in cases
in which they have a personal or family stake, they can be impeach-
ed by Congress. But I search the Constitution in vain for any power
of surveillance which other federal judges have over those abbera-
tions . . . ." Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit of the
United States, 398 U.S. 74, 136-37, 140-41 (1970) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
The Court, however, has stated in a matter involving the discipline of an
attorney:
"The courts ought not to hesitate. . . to protect themselves from
scandal and contempt and the public from prejudice by removing
grossly improper persons from participation in the administration
of the law." Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (OTTO 1882).
Some writers have gone further and stated that the United States
Supreme Court, as part of its implied and inherent powers, has the right to
discipline as well as remove federal judges. See Burke Shartel, Federal
Judges-Appointment, Supervision, and Removal-Some Possibilities
Under the Constitution, 28 Mich.L.Rev. 723 (1930).
We suggest that the United States Supreme Court consider an appropri-
ate disciplinary structure within its inherent powers to discipline the federal
judiciary. Such a structure would provide accessible means to receive and
process complaints from the public and the legal profession in accordance
with these standards.
The second alternative for a federal judicial discipline would be the
adoption of a constitutional amendment similar to that in effect in states.
This means to obtain a disciplinary structure for the federal judiciary would
be a cumbersome process which would take years to accomplish.
The third alternative would establish a disciplinary structure for the
federal judiciary by congressional act. There have been and there are now
before Congress congressional acts which would establish such a discipli-
nary structure. Such a congressional act is subject to possible constitutional
attack on the authority of Congress to define "good behavior" for the
judicial branch. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) which spells
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out the powers of Congress to expel one of its own members. We note,
however, that the Federal Judicial Conference has approved in principle this
approach.
In conclusion we emphatically recommend a disciplinary procedure be
established for the federal judiciary and suggest that these standards be
implemented in whatever method is adopted.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW
PUBLISHED BY THE STUDENTS OF THE
ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY/CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW


























































PROFESSOR JOAN E. STEINMAN, Faculty Advisor
DEAN LEWIS M. COLLENS
MEMBER, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LAW REVIEWS
The Illinois Institute of Technology/Chicago-Kent College of Law
assumes no responsibility for any statement appearing in the
columns of this publication.
VOLUME 54 1977 NUMBER I

